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Abstract.  This article provides a political psychological commentary on the contemporary controversy 
concerning the reliability and validity of the Rorschach. 
 
There is a long tradition of psychologist crusaders on a mission to identify and debunk the softness of 
clinical psychological judgment in contrast to the hardness of physical sciences predictability.  These 
engagers in games of j’accuse have most often either contrasted the goodness of statistical (actuarial) 
judgment with the badness of non-statistical judgment or the goodness of objective assessment with 
the badness of projective assessment.  What the crusaders seem to have in common is a quest to 
contort theory and methodology to a reality that may not exist.  Interestingly, this is the very thing they 
attribute to the targets of their crusade. 
 
A very recent case in point is the textbook by Wood et al. (2003) that attacks the reliability and validity 
of psychological assessment via the Rorschach--commonly referred to by the lay public as the inkblot 
test.  The authors’ indictment includes assertions that (1) the interpretation of Rorschach data does not 
rely on sufficient criteria to differentiate between clinical and non-clinical populations, (2) scores on 
various Rorschach indices are suspect because they are dependent on the subjective judgments of 
individuals who administer the Rorschach, and (3) scores on various Rorschach indices do not measure 
what they are reputed to measure.  We are left with the conclusion attributed in The New York Times to 
Wood that tarot cards would work almost as well the Rorschach in helping to make psychological 
judgments. 
 
Differentiating Between Clinical and Non-Clinical Populations.  This topic is but one example of a larger 
set bearing on the Rorschach’s accuracy (based on various subscores, in turn, based on the raw data of 
test responses) in making socio-legal judgments.  Such judgments include not only who may be correctly 
or incorrectly assigned a label of a specific emotional or mental disorder, but also who may or may not 
be a good or better parent in custody evaluations, a perpetrator of misdemeanors and felonies, a 
competent formal leader for an organization, a safe bet to be awarded a security clearance or other 
position requiring significant trust, and so on. 
 
One can strongly make the case that specific Rorschach scores have inadequate predictive validity in 
such matters, but this should not be surprising, because the Rorschach was not constructed with this 
intent and is not used in this manner by competent practitioners.  Instead, the Rorschach is reputed by 
competent practitioners to allow meaningful inferences to be made about intrapsychic and behavioral 
tendencies—in conjunction with the data of others psychological tests and other life data about the 
individual in question.  Thus, damning the Rorschach for not doing what it is not supposed to do may 
only be a powerful rhetorical gambit in the politics of applied psychology, not an immutable sign of 
eternal damnation. 
 
Subjective Judgments.  One can best understand attacks on the Rorschach for its subjectivity in three 
different ways.  First, one may faithfully record the raw data of a response to a Rorschach card, but 
then—before some sort of interpretive analysis is applied--one must code the response in terms of its 
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semantic content, its goodness of fit to the visual stimulus, and many other aspects.  This coding is 
unfavorably contrasted by Rorschach opponents with objective psychological assessment wherein the 
coding of raw data has been already been built into the scoring. 
 
However, the reliability of non-built-in coding can be demonstrated to be high enough not to ineluctably 
threaten validity.  In fact, whether coding is built-in or not, the bottom line of the meaningfulness and 
accuracy of interpreting coded data is a separate Issue. 
 
Second, one may interpret raw data directly based solely on semantic and syntactical meaning that, in 
turn, may be suggestive of signs, symbols, and other products of semiotics.  Rorschach opponents 
consider such an enterprise non-scientific and subject to a host of dysfunctional cognitive heuristics. 
 
However, from an epistemological perspective, formal empirical and experimental approaches do not 
have a market on knowledge and something that might be called Truth.  Reason and logic, faith, 
anecdotal and nonsystematic empiricism and experimentalism, and appeals to other standards of 
authority including one’s intuition have their place in the human enterprise of knowing.  To constrain 
acceptable psychological assessment to several variants of logical positivism--when even the putative 
exemplars of the approach, theoretical and experimental physicists, have effectively critiqued it--
exemplifies both hubris and a naïve philosophy of science.  In fact, a belief that human psychology must, 
a priori and a posteriori, be most amenable to reified approaches from the physical sciences may itself 
be a lucrative target of assessment. 
 
Third, the Rorschach assessor is said to be employing mind, while the objective assessor is not.  But 
Rorschach opponents can no more jettison mind, whatever it might denote and connote, than anyone 
else.  Mind is mind, whether through employing a sophisticated set of algorithms or a nonverbalized 
hunch. 
 
Not Measuring What is Supposed To Be Measured.  Claiming that the Rorschach does not measure what 
its good-faith users claim it measures presupposes that there are measures of what the Rorschach is 
reputed to measure that, indeed, measure the latter.  Rorschach opponents round up the usual suspects 
of such measures and claim insufficient convergent and divergent validity on the part of the Rorschach. 
 
However, these usual suspects have their own problems.  Their claims to validity may be based on huge 
samples employed during standardization so that very small differences between subject groups are still 
statistically significant.  As well, nomothetic truths may have little utility in the idiographic judgment of a 
specific case unless measures of variability around some norm are extremely small.  In addition, there 
may not even be alternative and valid measures of much of what good-faith Rorschach users claim to be 
searching for. 
 
One might well conclude that conflict between supporters of objective and projective and that between 
statistical and non-statistical are as much ideological, or even religious, as scientific.  In fact, one’s 
position on the conflict may be as meaningful an indicator of one’s own psychology as other commonly 
used personality criteria, constructs, and means of assessment.  All of this can be apperceived within a 
political context—competitors seeking to satisfy infinite needs with only finite resources available in a 
public forum. 
 
(See Exner, J.E., Jr.  (1999). The Rorschach: Measurement concepts and Issues of validity.  In S. E. 
Embretson, & S.L. Hershberger (Eds.).  The new rules of measurement: What every psychologist and 
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educator should know. (pp. 159-183). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; Eysenck, H.  (1957).  Sense and 
nonsense in psychology.  Pelican; Masling, J.  (2002). How do I score thee? Let me count the ways. Or 
some different methods of categorizing Rorschach responses.  Journal of Personality Assessment, 79, 
399-421; Raskin, J. D., & Sampson, K.  (2002). A constructivist perspective on the science and practice of 
Rorschach.  Humanistic Psychologist, 30, 209-222; Weiner, I.  (2002). Psychodiagnostic testing in forensic 
psychology: A commentary.  Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 2, 113-119; Wood, J.M., Nezworski, 
M.T., Lilienfeld, S.O., & Garb H.N.  (2003).  What’s wrong with the Rorschach?.  Jossey-Bass.) 
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